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Since the ﬁrst seminal papers on the North-South economic interaction and growth,
based on the notions of innovation, technology transfers and product cycles, the impact of
globalization and the developing regions’ opening to trade has attracted wide attention in
economics literature. From the initial interest in explaining the role of technology and its
transfer from the developed, industrialized North to the less developed South in shaping
the world trade patterns, the focus has shifted to the mechanisms that deﬁne the feedback
eﬀect of trade on the incentives to develop and imitate the technologies. The protection of
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) within a globalized, trading world has been in the center
of the ongoing debate as it directly aﬀects the incentives for innovation in the North and the
imitation in the South.
The traditional trade models, which rely on a comparative advantage based on regions’
technology or endowments, or the new trade theory, designed to explain trade between the
countries at a similar level of development, fail to replicate recent evidence on world trade
patterns and prices. This evidence reveals North-South specialization across products of the
same industries and product groups but diﬀerent quality, rather than across diﬀerent in-
dustries. Furthermore, countries at a higher level of technological development have higher
export prices, which shows that more advanced technology does not necessarily imply higher
cost eﬃciency. Therefore, in order to analyze the endogenous growth mechanisms and im-
plications of the IPR protection policy in a North-South trade set-up, this thesis develops
a fully-endogenous theoretical framework based on the notion of quality vintages, which re-
sults in the North-South production and trade specialization in diﬀerent quality segments
of the market. The model is used to investigate the growth eﬀects of the South opening to
trade and the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent IPR policy instruments. Finally, the last chapter
abstracts from endogenous growth mechanisms and focuses on the role of quality and cost
eﬃciency in replicating the trade data.
In detail, the ﬁrst chapter introduces a model of North-South trade with endogenous
growth through innovation and imitation that is used to re-examine the impact of trade and




IPR protection on both the innovation in the North and the quality lag of the South. It
is found that opening to trade increases the growth rate and welfare of both regions, but
results in a larger lag in the quality level of the South. Stronger IPR protection decreases the
world growth rate and increases the quality lag of the South, while the welfare is reduced.
However, as opposed to the autarky case with the full catch-up of the South under no
protection, the quality lag of the South is positive even with no IPR protection as a result
of the revealed comparative advantage in lower quality goods production and trade. This
contradicts the common predictions of Southern take-over of the whole industries due to bad
IPR enforcement.
The second chapter of the thesis analyzes the welfare eﬀects of international IPR protec-
tion in the North-South trade model with endogenous R&D in the two regions, as presented
in chapter one. Two questions are addressed, the welfare and growth implications of per-
fectly enforceable patents of ﬁnite length compared to a world with no IPR protection, and
the eﬀects of the alternative IPR policy measures when patents are poorly enforced. The
welfare optimizing patent length, from the perspective of the North, is positive and larger
than the natural distance of the South, but it necessarily reduces the welfare of the South
and growth in both regions. Compared to the social optimum, welfare and growth in both
regions are lower, as the optimal North-South specialization pattern over quality is distorted.
When patents are not enforced, in the sense that they prevent copying but allow the North
to impose barriers on the imports of copies, the results show negative welfare and growth
eﬀects of increased protectionism. Substituting the lack of patent protection with other pol-
icy measures (information protection or an increase in the patent length) does not result in
a welfare or growth improvement that would restore the levels that prevail in a world with
either no IPR protection or perfectly enforced patents.
The ﬁnal, third chapter proposes a trade model with exogenous technological lag of the
South behind the North, but it introduces heterogeneous ﬁrms in two dimensions, quality
and cost eﬃciency, which allows matching the evidence on world trade intensities and the




prices of traded goods in relation to income per capita. Taking prices as a proxy for quality
recent empirical literature identiﬁes a positive relation between income per capita and both
export and import prices, suggesting that rich countries trade goods of relatively higher
quality. Instead of relying on the speciﬁc demand side mechanisms such as non-homothetic
preferences, the chapter focuses on the North-South diﬀerences in technology. It employs a
four country North-South trade model with two dimensions of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Diﬀerences
in the ﬁrms’ product qualities and cost eﬃciencies result in a price distribution generating
diﬀerent consumption bundles and the observed export and import prices across rich and
poor countries. Furthermore, the resulting total expenditure allocation across quality shows
that the North (South) spends a larger share of its income on high (low) quality even with
the same homothetic preferences across the regions.
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Innovation and Imitation in a Model
of North-South Trade
1.1 Introduction
The issues of trade and economic growth have been popular debate topics in the literature
for more than two decades. Given the rapid increase in trade activity between the developed
North and less developed South, particular attention has been given to the impact of South
opening to trade on growth and welfare of the two regions.At the same time, concerns have
been raised over the common practice of the South to copy Northern innovations and win the
market shares due to substantially lower production costs. Numerous papers have already
dealt with this issue, but recent evidence on the dimensions and market segments in which
the North-South competition occurs calls for a diﬀerent approach. This paper applies the
notion of vertical innovation, incorporating the idea of quality vintages. In that framework,
a diﬀerent modeling of the IPR regime and the target of imitative eﬀort of the South is
introduced in order to revisit the implications of the South opening to trade. Finally, the
eﬀect of diﬀerent levels of the IPR protection is analyzed in order to assess whether this
Northern fear of losing economic dominance is indeed reasonable even with the low levels of
3
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IPR protection in the South.
This paper considers a model of North-South trade and endogenous growth which at-
tempts to be in accordance with the empirical evidence on the current world trade patterns.
Namely, the existing literature on North-South trade usually assumes that the trade pat-
tern is determined either through endowment-driven specialization in diﬀerent industries, or
through technology-driven horizontal specialization in diﬀerentiated goods of the same value
within the same industry. In the case of vertical intra-industry diﬀerentiation of goods,
industries are modeled as monopolies so that imitation results in a product cycle with the
whole industry being shifted between regions. Thus, the implied trade pattern is again of
the inter-industry type. However, recent empirical evidence suggests that the North-South
direct competition for dominance over entire industries might be exaggerated. Not neglect-
ing the importance of the inter-industry specialization of countries, and thus, the importance
of one-way-trade ﬂows in the world, Fontagne et al. (2008) presents strong evidence of the
North-South vertical specialization within industries. The North includes USA, Japan and
EU25 as developed countries, while the South is a group of emerging countries, such as
China, Russia, Brazil, India and others. When traded goods are distinguished according to
the unit quality level, specialization in diﬀerent quality ranges is revealed. It is argued that
export bundles of these two regions are very similar at the industry level (low importance of
inter-industry specialization), somewhat less similar at the product level (some evidence on
horizontal intra-industry specialization), while the export structure is completely diﬀerent
at the quality level. South exports are of low quality, while North exports are of high qual-
ity. This supports intra-industry vertical specialization and the two-way trade in qualities
within products.1 In terms of market shares, there is strong evidence of down-market (low
quality) share shifts in favor of the South, while in the up-market segment the North has
the advantage. At the same time, within the South, only China is making slight gains in
up-market share. Thus, there might be some basis for the Northern fear of competition from
1See also Schott (2004) for evidence on the unit value of US imports conditional on exporter’s income
per capita, which supports the specialization across quality in relation to income per capita.
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the growing South. However, this fear should not be exaggerated nor based on the common
accusations that the large South, led by China, will soon become the manufacturing factory
of the world and overtake this and other industries from the North. The reasoning should
be based on the degree of the technological development of the South and its incentive and
ability to advance in overtaking the up-market shares, regardless of the industry. Undoubt-
edly, IPR violation helps the South in doing so, but it seems that the North has been able
to resist the competitive pressure through specialization in high qualities. Following the
empirical ﬁndings, the aim of this paper is twofold. On one hand, its purpose is to develop
a theoretical framework which replicates the new specialization pattern, and on the other,
to use it for the analysis of endogenous technological progress, the impact of IPR protection
policy and welfare implications.
This paper develops an endogenous R&D model of two regions and analyzes two scenarios
based on the degree of trade openness. The North conducts innovating R&D which results in
the creation of new varieties, each of a higher quality than the preceding one. The South is
involved in the imitation of Northern products but at a certain lag. In the autarky scenario,
there is no trade between the regions, but the South is still able to imitate Northern products
at a lag. There are no patents, but the North can limit the leak of information concerning
blueprints and thus aﬀect the associated diﬃculty of imitation. In the second scenario, both
regions are open to trade and the diﬃculty of imitation is still aﬀected by the protection
of information. This paper analyzes the determinants of the innovation eﬀort in the North
and the distance (on the quality-product scale) between the highest quality goods produced
in the North and those produced in the South in a steady-state equilibrium within the two
set-ups. The question of the incentives and the mechanisms for closing the gap is implicitly
addressed as well.
The foundation for this study comes from two related groups of studies - a large body
of literature on trade and growth (particularly in the North-South framework), and the
literature on product cycles dealing with the issues of innovation and imitation. Vernon
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(1966) was ﬁrst to raise the question of the North-South shift of production location in
diﬀerent stages of a product life cycle. A contemporary version of product cycle is presented
by Antras (2005). What is common to both papers is that technological transfer comes only
as a result of optimizing behavior of Northern ﬁrms.
Following the initial steps of Krugman (1979), Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b) are the
most inﬂuential articles in which the production shifts occur due to imitation in an endoge-
nous growth set-up. In both articles, the North is endowed with a comparative advantage,
high enough to ensure that innovation takes place in the North and production transfers to
the South due to endogenous imitation whose intensity determines the time of the transfer.
They combine the notions of the quality ladder (a) or the variety expansion (b) with product
cycles to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing the simultaneous behavior of inno-
vation and imitation rates. The results show an increase in innovation and imitation rates
coinciding with the two regions opening to trade. Although this paper uses on the same
framework in many aspects, one of the main diﬀerences is the imitational R&D mechanism
and the resulting target of imitation. The South does not necessarily aim at imitating the
state-of-the-art products, but reproduces the less advanced goods up to the quality level de-
termined in the stationary equilibrium. In other words, the endogenous level of R&D eﬀort
in the South determines how far, in terms of quality level, the imitation can reach, and not
only how quickly and not at what scale it can replicate the most advanced industries of the
North. In this way, the focus is shifted from the diﬀerences in growth rates to the diﬀerences
in quality attainment of the two regions. With opening to trade, the innovation eﬀort in
the North increases, which results in the higher growth rates of both regions, but does not
imply faster imitation by the South. This is due to the fact that innovative R&D not only
creates new higher quality varieties, but also determines the incremental increase in quality
for each new variety. Thus, higher innovation implies higher quality jumps which decreases
relative R&D productivity in the South and requires stronger copying eﬀort (higher cost)
for any given lag behind the North. This opens a new dimension along which the regions’
comparative advantage over quality is determined and allows for the international IPR policy
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analysis in a set-up that can predict the observed North-South trade patterns.
Helpman (1993) analyzes the welfare eﬀects of the IPR protection in a framework that
considers endogenous innovation but only exogenous imitation, and thus, does not capture
the endogenous response of the imitation eﬀort in the South to the changes in the innovational
R&D in the North. More recent work in this ﬁeld that relies on Grossman and Helpman’s
framework but considers endogenous imitation is presented in Parello (2008), Sener (2006),
Stryszowski (2006). However, these papers do not consider the endogenous quality level
attained by the South, only the endogenous rate of imitation of the Northern industries as
aggregate measures. Horowitz and Lai (1996) analyze the IPR policy in autarky, but similarly
to the idea here, they consider a technological lag in the sense that imitators cannot copy
the most advanced products but copy only up to a certain level of quality, depending on
the productivity of imitation. However, this lag is a result of the legally binding patents of
a certain length and not a consequence of the imitators’ optimization given the imitation
technology. The IPR policy instrument introduced in this paper is in a form of intensive
protection (information secrecy vs. extensive protection in the form of patents) and is
given by a parameter that directly aﬀects the imitational R&D productivity in the South.
However, this instrument of IPR protection is not the only factor of inﬂuence on the R&D
productivity in the South relative to that in the North. Increased IPR protection does make
imitation more diﬃcult, but the R&D technology in the South is also a function of the quality
distance behind the North. The further behind the most advanced Southern variety is, the
less diﬃcult it is to imitate and the productivity of R&D is higher. In those terms, following
Gancia and Zilibotti (2005), R&D technology in the South is modeled as a function of the
relative quality index (South quality relative to that in the North), and thus as a function
of the distance. In this way, this paper assumes also natural impediments of technological
transfer besides the imposed IPR protection.
The framework in which this paper deals with the issues of the North-South trade mostly
resembles Segerstrom and Dinopoulos (2006), whose structure of presentation is followed
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closely. They study a quality ladder model with a ﬁxed number of industries, each producing
only state-of-the-art goods. Once the good has been imitated, production moves to the
South, yet returns to the North when that speciﬁc industry innovates again. In this paper,
the number of varieties increases, but the notion of vintages is used to enrich the variety-
expanding set-up with the improvements in quality. In this way, diﬀerent qualities are not
perfect substitutes, which allows for the production and consumption of the whole range of
qualities, not only state-of-the-art goods. Furthermore, Segerstrom and Dinopoulos (2004)
analyzes the eﬀect of globalization through an increase in the size of the South, but does not
study the eﬀect of moving from autarky to trade, which is of interest here. Also, the growth
rate of the two regions is semi-endogenous and is a function of the population growth rate,
while here the equilibrium growth rate is a result of the interaction of the innovation and
imitation mechanisms and is also aﬀected by the IPR policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the two scenarios (au-
tarky, free trade and restricted trade) and solves for the steady-state equilibrium analytically,
section 3 analyzes the eﬀect of a stronger IPR protection numerically, section 4 concludes
and suggests steps for future research.
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1.2 Autarky
1.2.1 The Model
The model considers two regions, the North and the South, which diﬀer in the abilities to
conduct R&D and in the wages (w) their workers earn, with Northern wage higher than that
in the South (wN(t) > wS(t)). As presented in the ﬁgure below, there is a continuum of goods
in the world market indexed by z(t) ∈ [−∞,nN(t)]. Each good is characterized by a higher
quality than the preceding one. Innovation is conducted by the North and each successful
innovation results in a new variety with increased quality compared to the previous one.
The North produces the whole range of existing varieties, [−∞,nN(t)], where nN(t).grows
through innovation. Workers in the South conduct imitative R&D and the highest quality
variety copied by the South is nS(t), being inside the range of varieties produced in the
North. The distance between the highest quality varieties produced in the North and the






Thus, the production in the two regions overlaps up to the variety nN(t) − d, while
varieties [nN(t) − d,nN(t)] have not been copied and are produced only by the North. As
there is no trade, the consumption bundles of the two regions are diﬀerent and consist only
of the varieties produced domestically.
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Consumers
The population in both regions is ﬁxed and it is of measure LN and LS in the North and
the South, respectively. Each individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically and earns
the wage (w). The wage is the same in both sectors of the economy, the manufacturing and
R&D, wN in the North and wS in the South. Labor is not mobile between the regions.
Consumers in both regions have the same preferences and they maximize lifetime utility






with ρ > 0 as the discount factor and u(t) the instantaneous utility given by
u(t) =


















Utility at time t is a quality-augmented CES consumption index with x(z,t) as the
consumption of variety z of quality index eγz(1−α). Variable γ measures the size of quality
improvement of each successive variety and is equal for both North and South. The parameter
α measures the substitution between varieties, with 1
1−α as the elasticity of substitution.
With 0 < α < 1, consumers prefer goods of higher quality (higher z).
Given prices, consumers maximize the instantaneous utility subject to their individual
expenditure on all goods (C(t)). This is a problem of static optimization across varieties
max











which gives the optimal demand for each variety
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The demand function takes the familiar form, where the share of each variety in the total
consumption is given by the share of its quality-price ratio in the index of price-quality ratios
of all varieties consumed (P).
With equal price of all varieties in a region (to be proved later), the demand function in











Dynamic optimization of the lifetime utility given (2), (3) and the budget constraint
˙ A(t) = w(t) − C(t) + r(t)A(t), (1.7)
where A(t) represents individual assets and r(t) the market interest rate at time t, results
in the Euler condition
˙ C(t)
C(t)
= r(t) − ρ. (1.8)
Expenditure grows only when the market interest rate exceeds subjective discount factor.
This paper will analyze a steady-state equilibrium in which wages (wN and wS) and expen-
ditures (CN and CS) do not change over time, and thus, market interest rate is constant and
equal to the subjective discount factor.
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Production
The North conducts costly innovative R&D, where the cost depends on the amount of
labor employed in the research and the productivity of the R&D technology. When a new
variety is invented, the producer that buys the blue-print becomes a monopolist. This is due
to the fact that under Bertrand competition, no other Northern ﬁrm will have an incentive
to copy a variety at any time. Its entry into the market and the competition with the ﬁrst
successful innovator would drive proﬁts down to zero and would not allow for covering the
R&D costs of imitation. For that reason, there is no need for any instrument of the IPR
protection domestically. Each good requires one unit of labor for production, so the ﬁrm
faces a marginal cost equal to wage wN. The monopolist determines the product price by
maximizing proﬁts subject to the consumers demand
maxp(z,t)x(z,t) − wx(z,t) subject to (1.5) (1.9)
yielding the optimal monopoly price




which is constant and equal across varieties. This implies that the consumers’ demand across
varieties increases with the quality level, but the demand for each variety decreases over time
due to invention of the higher quality varieties.
The South is involved in the imitative R&D and incurs costs depending on the R&D
labor and the productivity of copying, which will also determine the highest quality level
copied. When a variety is copied successfully, the imitator becomes a monopolistic producer
using one unit of labor per good, so the marginal cost equals wage wS. The ﬁrm charges the
monopoly price which is needed to compensate for the cost of the blue-print
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As in the North, under Bertrand competition, no other Southern ﬁrm will have an incen-
tive to copy an already copied product since its entry drives proﬁts down to zero and does
not allow for covering the R&D costs of copying a copy.
Both regions ﬁrms earn proﬁts only at the local markets, and the proﬁts are given by
ΠN(z,t) = pNxN(z,t)LN − wNxN(z,t)LN = (1 − α)γe
γ(z−nN(t))CNLN (1.12)
ΠS(z,t) = pSxS(z,t)LS − wSxS(z,t)LS = (1 − α)γe
γ(z−nN+d)CSLS. (1.13)
At any time t, the innovator’s and the imitator’s proﬁts increase in total expenditure
(CNLN, CSLS) and quality jump (γ), but they decrease over time as the quality level of the
particular variety decreases relative to the highest quality produced.
R&D Processes
The North employs labor of measure RN(t) in research which, if successful, results in the
invention of a new good of higher quality. The innovation is characterized by a diﬃculty
parameter β > 0, with 1













The speciﬁcation above implies that γ(t)(1 − α)zN(t) = γ(t)(1 − α)zN
o + ˆ γN(t)t, and
taking derivative with respect to time, one obtains ˙ γ(1 − α)zN(t) + γ(t)(1 − α)˙ zN = ˙ γ(1 −
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dt t + ˆ γN(t). From the left-hand side, the technological progress comes in two
forms, the invention of new goods and the increase in quality, which we might call extensive
and intensive margins of change, respectively. Diverging from the common practice found in
the growth literature, where the size of each quality jump is taken as constant and exogenous
when analyzing the endogenous innovation rate, the assumption here is exactly the opposite.
The invention frequency is exogenous and new products arrive along with time, i.e. ˙ zN = 1.
However, the size of quality improvement with each new product is left free to be determined
endogenously. In this way, the ranges of varieties can also be regarded as the measure of time,
so that d in fact represents the lag of South in time. The analysis in this paper focuses on the
balanced growth path (BGP) with a constant growth rate of the quality index (
dˆ γN(t)
dt = 0)
and the constant size of endogenous quality jumps (˙ γ = 0), so that the last expression, with
˙ zN = 1, collapses to
γ(1 − α)˙ zN = γ(1 − α) = ˆ γN
Imitation is conducted by the Southern R&D labor of measure RS(t), with the diﬃculty
parameter θ(d) > 0, which is proportional to β, but depends on the North-South distance.
Namely, it can be argued that as the South attempts to imitate more intensively and decrease
the quality gap relative to the North, the copying process increases in diﬃculty, and thus, θ is
assumed to be a decreasing function of d. This factor of proportionality to β is given by the
ratio of the highest quality in the South and the one in the North.2 An additional parameter,
η, with η ≥ 1, represents the degree of the IPR protection by the North and directly
aﬀects the diﬃculty (productivity) of copying.3 Therefore, the productivity of copying (1
θ)
is decreasing in η and increasing in d. With the free ﬂow of information (η = 1) and no
distance in quality (d = 0), θ becomes equal to β.
2See Acemoglu et al.(2006) and Stryszowski (2006) for similar modeling of imitational R&D productivity.
3Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) ﬁnds that patents rarely hinder imitation but make it more expensive. This
closely corresponds to the idea of making imitation more diﬃcult, and thus more labor demanding and more
costly, which would be the interpretation of η.
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As for the North, ˙ γ = 0 and
dˆ γS(t)
dt = 0 at the BGP, so that γ(1 − α)˙ zS = ˆ γS. The main
trade-oﬀ in this paper is expressed in the relation between the intensive margin of innovation,
given by γ, and the imitation distance coming from the South, given by d, in a steady-state
equilibrium. To analyze this relation, this paper focuses on a steady-state equilibrium in
which the quality distance d = nN − nS between the North and the South is constant. This
implies that for each new variety invented, one more variety is copied. In other words, ˙ z
is the same in both regions, so it equals 1 in the South as well. Finally, this implies that
ˆ γ = γ(1 − α) which is equal in both regions.
R&D Optimization
The expected beneﬁt of a successful R&D eﬀort, the value of a new variety, is represented
by expected discounted proﬁts from innovating or copying in the North and the South,
respectively. Having assumed that dz
dt = ˙ z = 1, it is convenient in computational sense to
discount the proﬁt ﬂows over the index z, since, under given assumptions, it is equivalent to
discounting over time.
With wages, prices and expenditures constant over time, proﬁts change due to the growth
in the price index. Therefore, the values of a new variety (VN) and a copy (VS) are given by
Borota, Teodora (2009) North-South Trade and Growth: The Role of Product Quality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/1373916 CHAPTER 1. INNOVATION, IMITATION AND NORTH-SOUTH TRADE




















The value of introducing a new variety is increasing in the total consumer expenditure
and size of the quality jump, while it is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between
varieties.
The entry into the R&D races is free and all participants have access to the same R&D
technology, so the beneﬁts of winning a race will equal the costs of R&D in a steady-state
equilibrium.
Given the speciﬁcation of the R&D technology, research labor required for each innovation
in the North is given by
RN = βγ(1 − α), (1.21)
and with wN as the cost of each unit of the research labor, the optimal R&D condition
(arbitrage condition) in the North is given by
VN = wNβγ(1 − α) (1.22)
Combining this condition with the expression for the value of a new variety, VN, it yields
1
γ + r
CNLN = wNβ. (1.23)
Similar derivation applies also to the South. Research labor needed for one new copy is
given by
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RS = θ(d)γ(1 − α), (1.24)
which, with the wage wS, yields the arbitrage condition in the South
1
γ + r
CSLS = wSθ(d). (1.25)
Labor Markets
Full employment of labor requires that in both regions at any time t all workers are
employed in either R&D sector or manufacturing. Under the assumption of dz = dt, at each
point in time, the total R&D labor in either region is actually equal to the labor requirement
for the development of one new product or a copy given by (1.21) for the North and (1.24)
for the South. Therefore, the full employment labor market conditions for the two regions
are given by
LN = RN +
  nN
−∞




LS = RS +
  nN−d
−∞




1.2.2 Steady-State Equilibrium Analysis
Combining the full labor employment conditions, (1.26) and (1.27), with the R&D op-
timization conditions given by (1.23) and (1.25) for the North and the South, respectively,
two steady-state equilibrium conditions are obtained,
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LN = βγ(1 − α) +
wNβ
pN
(γ + r) = β(γ + rα) (1.28)
LS = θ(d)γ(1 − α) +
wSθ(d)
pS
(γ + r) = θ(d)(γ + rα). (1.29)





The quality jump depends positively on the productivity of the R&D labor, 1
β, while a
higher interest rate and a larger α (higher elasticity of substitution) decrease γ due to their
negative impact on the value of the innovation.4 In the autarky scenario, the quality lag of
the South has no impact on the quality jump which is solely determined by the conditions of
the North. This results in the vertical Northern condition in the (γ,d) space in the autarky
steady state equilibrium diagram (Figure 1.2).











Higher γ implies smaller quality distance between the North and the South, as it increases
the value of imitation and R&D labor productivity in the South, which together counteracts
the increase in the R&D labor cost. In autarky, γ comes as ”manna from North” whose
increase results in a higher productivity in the South, reallocation of labor towards the R&D
sector and a faster catch-up. Therefore, the Southern equilibrium condition is downward
4The model exhibits scale eﬀect, which might not be of concern in a model with no population growth.
Moreover, in the free trade scenario, the scale eﬀect appears only in a relative form, where the quality lag
depends on the ratio of the regions’ sizes. In this model, scale eﬀect could be corrected for by assuming that
the number of industries is proportional to the population size.
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sloping in Figure 1.2. The elasticity of substitution and the degree of information protection





Figure 1.2: Steady state equilibrium in autarky
As by the construction of the model, the quality lag of the South cannot be negative, the
assumption LN ≥ LS is imposed. This restriction might seem too strong if the labor sizes are
expressed in absolute terms of the population sizes. However, as the model does not include
measures of the human capital and assumes equal productivity in the manufacturing sector
in the North and in the South, the labor sizes might be regarded in terms of the eﬀective
labor size. In that sense, the assumption implies that the total eﬀective labor in the North is
at least as large as the total eﬀective labor in the South. This paper focuses on the analysis
of the eﬀects of opening to trade, and not the analysis of the autarky itself, and therefore
the human capital measure has been left out in order to keep the analysis simple and focus
on the diﬀerences in the R&D productivities.
Consumers in both regions maximize their lifetime utility subject to their budget con-
straint given by the expression for the change in assets they possess, A, i.e. ˙ A = w−C +rA.
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is constant in a steady-state equilibrium with constant w, C and r. It follows that A is
constant which implies C − w = rA, and in aggregate form
CNLN = wNLN + r ¯ AN in the North, and
CSLS = wSLS + r ¯ AS in the South. ¯ AN represents total Northern assets, which are
equal to the sum of the values of all existing ﬁrms in the North at time t, while ¯ AS stands
for the total assets in the South, equal to the sum of the values of all copies at a given time
t. Therefore, ¯ A =
  ∞
0 V (a)da, where V (a) stands for the value of a periods old ﬁrm at time
t. This yields the expenditure conditions
CNLN = (1 − α)rwNβ + wNLN (1.32)
CSLS = (1 − α)rwSθ(d) + wSLS (1.33)
Utility in both regions is equal to
C
P
, and with constant consumer expenditure, the utility
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1.3 Trade
1.3.1 The Model
The paper now considers two regions, the North and the South, which are open to trade.
The South still produces varieties up to the one at d distance from the highest quality variety
in the North. Since wN > wS, the South can produce these varieties at a lower cost and due
to free trade, it is no longer optimal for the North to continue their production. However, the
range of varieties that have not been copied by the South, [nN(t) − d,nN(t)], are produced
and traded exclusively by the North. As presented in the ﬁgure below, there is a continuum
of goods in the world market indexed by z(t) ∈ [−∞,nN(t)], but there is no overlapping in
the production as in the autarky case; the South specializes in the production and trade of
low quality varieties, while the North specializes in the high quality ones. The IPR protection





Traded by South Traded by North
Figure 1.3: Trade
The composition of the consumption bundles is the same in both regions, as Southern
consumers have access to the whole range of varieties due to trade. Since all world consumers
are buying a particular variety at the same price (markup over the marginal cost in the region
of production), the quality-price index is the same in both regions.
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As in the autarky, the North (the South) conducts innovative (imitative) R&D and
after a new variety is invented, each unit of good requires one unit of labor for production.
The monopolist, innovator or imitator, determines the product price by maximizing proﬁts
subject to the consumers demand which again, yields the optimal monopoly price.
pi(z,t) = pi =
1
α
wi. i = N,S (1.36)
However, the revenue now comes from both domestic and foreign market, and for the
North it comes from sales of the [nN(t) − d,nN(t)] range of varieties, while the South sells
varieties in the range [−∞,nN(t)−d]. The value of a new variety or a new copy is determined
as the discounted stream of proﬁts from the domestic and the foreign market over the period
of ﬁrm’s operation. However, the life of a variety in the North is now not inﬁnite but
terminates at the time it is successfully copied by the South, i.e. d periods after the invention.
Therefore, the time span over which the proﬁts are discounted is diﬀerent in the North and



























where ˜ P = P
α
α−1e−γnN and CL = CNLN+CSLS. Both values are functions of the total world
demand, however, they are also functions of diﬀerent life length of a new variety, compared
to the autarky. In the North, this comes as the explicit cut of the variety life from below,
represented by the (1 − e−(γ+r)d) term, as the North loses the production of low quality
varieties. In the South, this life span change does not come in the form of the ﬁnite life of
a variety, but rather as an implicit cut of its life from above, as the highest quality in the
South is no longer the highest one consumers allocate their expenditure to. In that sense,
e−γd term represents the loss in quality position relative to the highest in the market, and
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thus the loss in the variety’s demand share relative to the total consumers demand. The
R&D technology is deﬁned in the same way as in the autarky scenario, and the arbitrage
conditions for the North and the South, obtained by equalizing the beneﬁts and costs of
























−γd = θ(d)γ (1.40)
1.3.2 Steady-State Equilibrium Analysis
The full employment labor market conditions for the two regions are given by




















which, when combined with the arbitrage conditions in the North and the South, (1.38) and
(1.39), yield the ﬁrst two steady-state equilibrium conditions, endogenous in γ and d
LN = βγ(1 − α) + αβ(γ + r)
1 − e−γd
1 − e−(γ+r)d (1.43)
LS = θ(d)(γ + αr) (1.44)
In the free trade scenario, the size of the quality jump is not determined exclusively by
the North, but also depends on the conditions of the South, so that γ and d are jointly
determined by the two equations above.
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The relative wage is proportional to the ratio of R&D productivities, corrected by the
terms referring to the varieties lifetime. Thus, the relative wage in fact comes from the ratio
of factual productivities in creating the value of new businesses in the two regions. When








Both γ and d have a positive impact on the relative wage, and so does the degree of
information protection which decreases the productivity of copying. For the model to be
one of the North-South trade, it is necessary for monopolistic price in the South to be lower
than the competitive price in the North. Therefore, the equilibrium ω has to be at least 1
α.5
From the condition above, it follows that the equilibrium distance in the trading world has
to be positive. Moreover, the size of the quality jump is positive in order to satisfy the wage
condition for any value of η and the equilibrium condition (1.43).
Proposition 1.1. The size of the quality jump, γ, increases with opening to trade.
Proof. With γ,η > 0, the term 1−e−γd
1−e−(γ+r)d is necessarily smaller than 1. For the equilibrium
condition (1.43) to be satisﬁed, γ in the free trade scenario has to be larger than γ in the
autarky that satisﬁes the condition (1.28), which completes the proof.
5With a wide range of parameters used in the numerical exercise, ω proves to be larger than 1 α. Even
when this is not the case, relative wage never becomes lower than one. That calls for the limit pricing with
the maximum price in the South being equal to the marginal cost in the North, without any loss in generality
of the results.
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The mechanism behind this eﬀect comes from the fact that varieties now live only d
periods in the North. This translates in the loss of the value of innovation represented by
1 − e−(γ+r)d, which implies that the innovators need larger quality jump to ensure higher
demand and their survival in the market. At the same time, the cut in the life of varieties
corresponds to the loss in the production of the whole range of low quality varieties in the
aggregate, those that are now produced exclusively by the South. Thus, the total demand
for Northern production and therefore manufacturing labor depends only on 1 − e−γd share
of expenditures. The excess manufacturing labor is being reallocated to the R&D sector,
which in turn raises γ, the demand for new varieties and for production labor. The process
continues until the full employment is restored, but as a result of more resources devoted to
R&D, γ is necessarily higher, compared to autarky.
The life of any variety introduced and produced in the South is still inﬁnite, so the
Southern equilibrium condition is of the unchanged form, however, γ and d in equilibrium
will be diﬀerent. The eﬀect of the increased size of the quality jump on the North-South
distance in quality will now depend on the parameters of the model and will be analyzed in











Proposition 1.2. Quality lag of the South, d, increases with opening to trade.
Proof. In the special case with no IPR protection (η = 1) and equal size of population
(LN = LS), the proof is straightforward. The distance of the South in the autarky given
by equation (1.31) is equal to zero. In the trade scenario, with an increase in γ, the term
β(γ + αr) is larger than LN and thus, ln(
ηβ(γ+αr)
LS ) > 0. Therefore, d > 0 in the trade
equilibrium. For η > 1 and LN > LS, see Appendix B. for proof.
Intuitively, opening to trade reveals the specialization pattern which comes about as a
result of the comparative advantage in the innovation/imitation and production of diﬀerent
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ranges of varieties in the North and in the South, high and low quality ranges respectively.
The loss of the low quality varieties allows the North to reallocate labor to comparatively
more productive R&D sector as it gets freed from the manufacturing of the low quality
varieties. The South concentrates on the production of the low quality range for the world
market.
Free trade steady state equilibrium is presented in Figure 1.4, in (γ,d) space. In compar-
ison with the autarky scenario both the North and the South conditions are changed. The
Northern condition is now downward sloping, implying a negative relation between γ and d.
Namely, with the larger lag of the South, on one hand, the North faces lower competitive
pressure from the South due to increased life of varieties, and thus a lower incentive for R&D,
and on the other hand it has to produce a larger range of varieties. Both eﬀects work in favor
of reallocating labor to manufacturing which results in the lower quality jump. Compared
to the autarky scenario, the Southern steady state condition is perhaps more striking. In
the free trade case, the conditions are upward sloping. An increase in the size of the quality
jump now results in an increase of the quality lag, as the rising value of imitation and R&D
labor productivity no longer counteract the increase in the R&D labor cost. This is the
result of a drop on the quality ladder of the highest quality good in the South relative to the
highest in the market, which was not the case in the autarky.
The role of η as the measure of the IPR protection will be analyzed in the numerical
exercise, but it should be noted that by aﬀecting productivity of copying and thus the
quality distance of the South, η has an eﬀect on γ in the free trade, and therefore on the







Trade is balanced and the increase in the size of the market caused by the opening to
trade has no direct eﬀect on the endogenous variables of the model. What plays the central
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Figure 1.4: Steady state equilibrium with trade
role is the competition eﬀect which brings along the specialization in diﬀerent ranges of
varieties, and thus the static and dynamic beneﬁts of trade.
Proposition 1.3. Welfare in both regions, the North and the South, increases with their
opening to trade, while it is decreasing with the tightening of the IPR protection (increase in
η).
Proof. See Appendix C.
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1.4 The IPR protection
This section investigates the impact of increasing information protection (η) on the size of
the quality jump (γ) and thus the growth rate of the economy, on the North-South distance in
quality (d), relative wage (ω) and the relative utility (welfare). The eﬀect of η on other vari-
ables of interest, mainly concerning the R&D sector and the value of innovation/imitation,
are reported as well, while the details of the parametrization and the calibration of the model
are given in the Appendix. In all exercises, the degree of information protection (IPR pro-
tection) varies from 1 which stands for a completely free ﬂow of information regarding the
blue-prints, to 1.4, a 40% tighter information ﬂow.
Figure 1.5 presents the results in the autarky scenario. Higher protection of information
by the North and thus, higher diﬃculty of copying in the South, has no eﬀect on the growth
rate, but increases the quality lag of the South. With the free ﬂow of information, the North-
South quality gap is closed as the South completely converges to Northern frontier through
copying.




























Figure 1.5: Autarky: The eﬀect of increase in IPR protection
When the two regions are open to trade (Figure 1.6), γ and d are determined simultane-
ously by the equilibrium conditions from the North and the South. For any level of η, the
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size of the quality jumps and also the quality lag of the South are both higher compared
to the autarky results for the reasons discussed in the previous section. In the free trade
scenario, the eﬀect of η on the distance also translates into the change in the size of the
quality jump. With the higher information protection, γ and the welfare in both regions
decrease, while the relative wage increases.










































Welfare (South − −)
Figure 1.6: Trade: The eﬀect of increase in IPR protection
The eﬀect of η on the quality lag is positive as in the autarky case, though the distance
is not zero even in the case of free information sharing. It might be concluded that trade
necessarily brings incentives for the specialization of both regions, no matter how weak the
IPR protection policy is. This results contradicts the common fear of the developed North
that the South might overtake all manufacturing industry from the North due to violation
of the IPR.
In most R&D driven growth models, higher protection of monopoly rights would bring
about an incentive to increase R&D eﬀort, which is not the case here (Figure 1.7). Raising
η raises the value of innovation in the North. However, due to the increase in the wage it
also raises the cost of R&D more than proportionally and puts a downward pressure on the
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R&D labor demand. Together with the growing lag of the South and thus higher demand
for the manufacturing labor in the North, this results in a lower R&D eﬀort and a decrease
in γ, until the arbitrage condition is satisﬁed.
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Figure 1.7: Trade: The eﬀect of increase in IPR protection on R&D variables
Intuitively, stronger IPR protection is not enhancing growth but relieving the monopolists
from the competitive pressure. In the South, an increase in η lowers the productivity of
copying, and with the lower quality jump also results in a lower value of imitation, which
cannot be compensated for by the decrease in the R&D cost. This brings about a decrease
in the Southern research labor and a higher d. Besides the dynamic loss in growth, the static
loss in both Northern and Southern welfare comes as a result of the lower quality jump and
the increase in the price index (higher relative wage and higher d).
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1.5 Conclusion
The topic of this paper has been the impact of trade and the IPR protection on the
intensive margin of innovation (size of quality jumps) and the extensive margin of imitation
(distance in quality, i.e. quality lag of the South) in a steady-state equilibrium. The motiva-
tion behind the proposed theoretical framework stems from the recent empirical evidence on
the North-South trade patterns which reveals the regions’ specialization in diﬀerent qualities
of the same product within industries, and much less in diﬀerent products or diﬀerent in-
dustries. By considering a model of North-South trade with the endogenous R&D processes
in both regions, innovation in the North and imitation in the South, the paper attempts
to derive the resulting growth and welfare eﬀects of opening to trade and changes in the
IPR in order to provide possible answers to some questions brought by globalization. Two
alternative scenarios are considered: the autarky case as a benchmark and the free trade
case employing information protection (”intensive” IPR policy tool).
Based on the analytical and numerical analysis, it is found that opening to trade increases
the growth rate of both regions while it also results in a larger lag in the quality level in the
South, implying the appearance of specialization in the South. Also, the quality lag of the
South is always positive in the trading world, contradicting the predictions of the Southern
catch-up due to intellectual theft.
Stronger IPR protection is not enhancing growth but relieving the monopolists from the
competitive pressure. Besides the dynamic loss in growth, the static loss in both Northern
and Souther welfare comes as a result of the lower quality jump and the increase in the price
index (higher relative wage and higher d).
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1.6 Appendix A: Calibration
Two parameters in this model can be determined empirically (r,α), while the rest of the
parameters,(β,LN,LS,η), remain to be calibrated.
The interest rate is set equal to subjective discount factor and taken to be 0.04 (4 percent).
Most empirical studies show evidence on monopolistic mark-ups in the range of 10-40%,
with the lowest ones being in the manufacturing industry. Since the model of interest in
this paper mostly refers to such industries (with stronger monopolistic competition, less
regulation and a larger number of producers), α is set closer to the lower bound at 0.89
which implies 12% mark-up and the elasticity of substitution between varieties of 8.
As there is no human capital in the model and due to presence of scale eﬀects in the
relative terms, equal size of the North and the South in the benchmark case is assumed, in
order to abstract from the relative size eﬀects. Nevertheless, the most important ﬁndings of
the model prove to be robust to the changes in the relative size of the two regions. There
are three calibration targets:
1) 1.5-2% growth of the economy
2) Northern relative wage of 2.2 (World Bank, International Comparison Program database,
online edition, 2009) which in turn gives benchmark IPR protection, η of 2.25. However,
since this paper examines the impact of IPR protection (η) ranging from free information
ﬂow (η = 1) to stronger levels of protection (η > 1), the resulting relative wage with low
protection will be lower. Had the model included the measure of human capital, that pa-
rameter could have been calibrated to match the size of the relative wage independent of η.
In that sense, η now includes more information than IPR protection. It measures the overall
productivity of the labor in the two regions, stemming from the level of the human capital
and the institutional quality in the two regions.
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3) 2% share of resources devoted to R&D relative to GDP in the North (average for
OECD countries; National Science Foundation, US, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics)
The resulting parameter values are 1.0335 diﬃculty of innovation, β (0.97 productivity
of innovation) and 0.1203 size of the population, L.
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1.7 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2. with η > 1 and LN > LS










In autarky, ηβ(γ + αr) = LN while in the trade equilibrium this term will increase due
to increase in γ. However, γ enters the condition in the 1
γ term, and the direction of the























− (1 − α)d.
For initial d not too large, such that it satisﬁes d < 1
(1−α)(γ+αr), the quality distance of
the South increases with opening to trade. This also provides proof for the upward sloping
Southern equilibrium condition in (γ,d) space.
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1.8 Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 3.
Welfare in the North in the autarky and the trade scenario, respectively, is given by
U
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in the autarky, and
U
T













in the trade scenario. The last term in the trade expression is larger than one, while the
second term represents the average quality index in the North which increases with opening
to trade due to an increase in γ, provided that the number of varieties, n, is large enough
to satisfy nγ > 1. The ﬁrst term in the welfare expression is the manufacturing labor which
decreases with opening to trade. Therefore, the direction of change in the welfare is deter-
mined by the prevailing eﬀect, an increase in average quality or decrease in manufacturing
labor and thus lower production. If nγ > 1, the numerical solution shows that the positive
eﬀect dominates and the welfare increases with opening to trade.
Welfare in the South in the autarky and the trade scenario, respectively, is given by
U
A






in the autarky, and
U
T












in the trade scenario. The analysis is similar to that of the eﬀect of opening to trade on the
welfare in the North. The last term in the trade expression is larger than one, while the second
term, the average quality index, increases if nγ > 1. The ﬁrst term is the manufacturing
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labor which decreases with opening to trade. Assuming nγ > 1, the numerical solution
shows that the welfare in the South increases with opening to trade.
The eﬀect of increased IPR protection on welfare in the North and the South in the
autarky equilibrium is diﬀerent. While there is no change in the Northern welfare with an
















In the trade scenario, numerical solution shows a decrease in both the Northern and the
Southern welfares with stronger IPR protection.
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Welfare Eﬀects of IPR Policy in a
North-South Trade Model
2.1 Introduction
Given the rapid increase in trade activity between the innovating North and the imitating
South, the issues of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection at the international
level have become a common topic in the economics literature and policy agendas. It is often
argued that the South enters the race by the means of unfair competition, through imitation
and intellectual theft and thus hurts the incentives for innovation in the North. From the
perspective of the South, there are fears that tightening of the IPR protection policy may
impose signiﬁcant impediment to development in the South. This paper analyzes the welfare
eﬀects of the international IPR protection in a model of North-South trade and endogenous
growth which is in accordance with the empirical evidence on current world trade patterns.
The new trade data reveals an international trade specialization of the North and the
South in varieties of diﬀerent quality level (high and low, respectively) within the same
product groups and the same industries. Therefore, the standard conception of North-South
head-on competition in the same market segments has been loosing empirical grounds. The
benchmark framework considers an endogenous R&D model of the two regions where the
41
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North conducts innovating R&D, which results in the creation of new varieties, each of a
higher quality than the preceding one. The South is involved in the imitation of Northern
products but at a certain lag. With opening to trade, the two regions specialize in the
production and export in diﬀerent quality segments of the market, the North specializing in
high quality and the South in the low one.
There are two questions to consider. The ﬁrst question concerns the welfare and growth
implications of the perfectly enforceable patents of ﬁnite length, implying no copying of
protected varieties, neither for domestic consumption nor for the export to the North. The
equilibrium results in the optimal patent length scenario are compared to those in the free
information ﬂow scenario in which there are no other impediments to imitation by the South
but its own productivity in the R&D sector. As for the second question, having in mind
the practical diﬃculty in implementing and enforcing patent rights internationally, the main
assumption is the lack of patent enforceability. Although the North cannot prevent the South
from imitating, it can ensure that Southern copies of protected varieties are not placed in
the Northern markets.1 In that scenario, trade occurs only in goods which are produced
exclusively by one region; goods whose patents have expired are traded by the South, while
the North produces and trades high quality goods that are too advanced to be imitated.
The middle range varieties are not traded. In such a set-up, the paper analyzes the eﬀects
of alternative IPR policy measures on the welfare and growth prospects of the two regions.
In particular, it should be determined whether an intensive form of protection (knowledge
ﬂow restriction or secrecy) or the extension of the patent length can serve as a substitute for
the poor IPR enforcement in the South.
Besides the old debate on the importance of the IPR protection for promoting R&D
in a closed economy, a large body of literature has dealt with the issue of international
harmonization of the IPR protection, especially after this topic was included in the oﬃcial
1Under most patent laws, the imitators in the South are not allowed to export copies to the Northern
market, which along with the poor protection of IPR implies the interpretation of the patent as a certain
form of trade barrier.
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WTO discussion agenda.2 Depending on a model set-up, the results related to the eﬀects of
the IPR protection have been mixed.3 Nevertheless, it is important to note that, apart from
the R&D incentive eﬀects of the IPR protection within a country, there is an additional,
comparative advantage dimension of the analysis within a trading world, particularly when
the countries with diﬀerent levels of technological development are involved. Thus, any
study of the IPR issues within such framework should take into account the beneﬁts of
specialization even if it requires a faster North-South technological transfer than what would
otherwise occur under perfect protection.
In general, most studies on North-South trade, growth and IPR introduce only a certain
policy parameter measuring the level of protection in terms of how hard (legally or tech-
nically) it is to copy a product successfully, but once that occurs, a copy competes freely
with the original in the market, and normally wins the battle due to lower costs. This IPR
instrument corresponds to the notion of information protection here. However, in a frame-
work that assumes diﬀerentiation of goods based on quality that is tied to the timing of the
invention, protection in the form of patent (time) has a fundamentally diﬀerent eﬀect. Those
two IPR instruments can not be regarded as the same: the ﬁrst one aﬀects the diﬃculty
of copying directly, the other aﬀects the timing of copying or the export ban lifting. Thus,
patents and secrecy deserve separate consideration, as the individual producers’ proﬁts, and
the resulting aggregate labor allocation and the investment in R&D are aﬀected in diﬀerent
ways, through diﬀerent mechanisms.
Dinopoulos et al. (2008a) considers a North-South growth and trade model where the
IPR protection is introduced as the ﬁnite-length, perfectly enforced global patents which are
awarded to Northern ﬁrms that discover new higher-quality products. They show that an
increase in the global patent length worsens the wage gap between the North and the South,
increases the rate of imitation and has an ambiguous eﬀect on growth. However, if the number
2The WTOs Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), was nego-
tiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round and it imposed the intellectual property rules into the multilateral
trading system.
3See, e.g. Scotchmer (2003), Saint-Paul (2007), Lai and Qiu (2003), McCalman (2001).
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of protected industries is high, then an increase in the patent length reduces the innovation
and growth rates. Dinopoulos et al. (2008b) analyzes the IPR policy harmonization based
on a stronger Southern protection and ﬁnds that a move towards better harmonization
accelerates the global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the North-South wage gap,
and has an ambiguous eﬀect on the rate of technology transfer. When there is a common
patent policy regime, then a stronger global IPR protection increases the rates of innovation,
growth and international technology transfer, and has no impact on the North-South wage
gap. The novelty in this paper is that it models the imitational R&D in the South in a
way that the R&D productivity decreases as the South attempts to copy products from the
higher position on the quality scale. It is found that the natural distance of the South in
the equilibrium is positive even with no IPR protection. However, the welfare optimizing
patent length, from the perspective of the North, is positive and larger than the natural
distance of the South, but it necessarily reduces the welfare of the South and growth in both
regions. The result stems from the fact that patents do not enforce incentives for R&D. On
the contrary, they only protect the monopoly rents, increase the wage gap and the cost of
R&D in both regions, and thus reduce the innovation in the North, and imitation and welfare
in the South. Higher Northern welfare comes only as a result of a higher wage. Compared to
the social optimum, welfare and growth in both regions are reduced, as the patent distorts
the optimal specialization pattern of the two regions over quality.
As far as the second part of the paper is concerned, Lai and Qiu (2004) investigate the
interaction of the IPR and trade protections and their impact on Northern and Southern wel-
fare. They ﬁnd a rationale for a higher Northern tariﬀ when protection is weak in the South.
While the IPR protection comes through ﬁnite patents and the trade protection through
tariﬀs, in this paper the instruments are somewhat opposite. The IPR protection is based
on secrecy and the trade barrier is an IPR policy instrument - ﬁnite patents. Namely, when
patents are not enforced to prevent copying, they might allow the North to prevent import of
protected varieties and therefore serve as a trade barrier. Although the analogy might seem
obvious, the results are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In this paper, increased protectionism in any
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form results in a lower welfare in the South, while increasing information protection up to
a certain point might increase the welfare in the North. This positive eﬀect does not occur
when the trade barrier is increased. Furthermore, growth eﬀects are always negative, and
neither global nor individual region’s welfare can attain the levels of the no-IPR protection
world.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model of enforceable
patents and compares the results with the no-patent scenario, section 3 assumes non-enforced
patents and analyzes the eﬀect of the two IPR instruments in a numerical exercise, while
section 4 concludes.
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2.2 No IPR protection vs. perfectly enforced patents
2.2.1 The Model
The benchmark model for the analysis of the enforceable patent impact on welfare and
growth is presented in the free trade scenario section of Chapter 1. The model considers
two regions, the North and the South, which have diﬀerent R&D capabilities and wages,
with wN(t) > wS(t). There is a continuum of goods in the world market indexed by
z(t) ∈ [−∞,nN(t)], where higher index z(t) also implies that the good is of higher qual-
ity. Innovation is conducted by the North and each successful innovation results in growth
of z(t), i.e. a new good of higher quality than the one previously invented is introduced in
the market. Workers in the South conduct imitative R&D and the highest quality variety
copied by the South is nS(t). The distance between the highest qualities produced in the
North and the South is of measure d, i.e. d(t) = nN(t) − nS(t). Both regions are open to
trade. Since wN > wS, the South can produce varieties up to variety nN(t) − d at a lower
cost and due to free trade it is no longer optimal for the North to continue their production.
However, the range of varieties that have not been copied by the South, [nN(t) − d,nN(t)],
are produced and traded exclusively by the North.
Consumers in both regions have the same preferences and they maximize lifetime utility






with ρ > 0 as the subjective discount factor, and u(t) the instantaneous utility given by
u(t) =


















Utility at time t is a quality-augmented CES consumption index where x(z,t) is the
consumption of variety z of quality index eγz(1−α). Variable γ, equal for both North and
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South, determines the size of quality improvement of each successive variety. Parameter α
measures the substitution between varieties, with 1
1−α as the elasticity of substitution.
With trade, the composition of the consumption bundle is the same in both regions as
all varieties are placed in both markets. With no variable trade cost, the price of any variety
is the same in the North and South and thus, the quality-price index is the same in both
regions.



















In both regions one unit of labor produces one unit of output and the market structure is
monopolistic competition. The monopolist (innovator or imitator) determines the product
price by maximizing proﬁts subject to the consumers demand which yields the optimal
monopoly price,
pi(z,t) = pi =
1
α
wi, i = N,S. (2.4)
The revenue of each ﬁrm comes from both domestic and foreign market. Firms in the
North produce [nN(t)−d,nN(t)] range of varieties, while ﬁrms in the South produce varieties
in the range [−∞,nN(t) − d]. The value of a new variety or a new copy is determined as
the discounted stream of proﬁts over the period of a ﬁrm’s operation. The life of a variety
in the North is not inﬁnite but terminates at the time it is successfully copied by the South,
i.e. d periods after the invention4.
The North and the South employ labor RN and RS, respectively, in the R&D sector
with the productivity 1/β in the North and 1/θ(d) in the South. The eﬀective R&D labor
(RN/β and R θ(d)) gives the growth rate of the quality index in each region. In a stationary
equilibrium with constant measure of quality jumps, γ, and constant growth of the quality
index, this growth rate is given by γ(1 − α) and is equal in both regions. The arbitrage
4The invention frequency is exogenous and new products arrive along with time, i.e. ˙ z = 1, but the size of
quality improvement with each new product is determined endogenously. Therefore, the ranges of varieties
is also the measure of time, so that d represents the lag of South in time.
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−γd = θ(d)γ. (2.6)
The full employment labor market conditions for the two regions are combined with the
arbitrage conditions (2.5) and (2.6) to the ﬁrst two steady-state equilibrium conditions, both
endogenous in γ and d,
LN = βγ(1 − α) + αβ(γ + r)
1 − e−γd
1 − e−(γ+r)d (2.7)
LS = θ(d)(γ + αr) (2.8)
The third equilibrium condition determines the relative wage given as the ratio of eﬀective
productivities of the R&D sectors in the two regions. The distance between the highest











With higher elasticity of substitution between varieties, higher interest rate and a less
open ﬂow of information (η higher than 1), the equilibrium d will be higher.
As a benchmark, η is set equal to 1, so that, under no restrictions in the form of patents,
there is no international IPR protection. After solving for the equilibrium of this scenario, a
patent of ﬁnite length T is introduced. The patents do not serve as the domestic IPR pro-
tection since copying of the products in the same region is not optimal, but rather represent
a form of international protection. It is assumed that patents impose perfect protection:
there is no imitation by the South up to the variety of index nN(t) − T. In that sense, T
acts as exogenously imposed d for the South, so that the highest quality attainment of the
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South is not an endogenous outcome in the equilibrium, but a constraint imposed by the
North which optimizes its welfare. Finally, this section considers a social planner who max-
imizes the global welfare and determines the optimal distance of the South, i.e. the optimal
patent length. The equilibrium welfare and growth in both regions in the three scenarios are
compared.
2.2.2 Numerical exercise
The dotted lines in Figure 2.1 represent the no-patent equilibrium values of growth rate
and welfares in the North and the South, respectively, with the resulting equilibrium quality
distance of the South at 14.5 years. The full lines represent the equilibrium values under
patents of length T, which is found to be optimal for the North at the value of 19.5 years.
The assumption of a perfectly free information ﬂow (η = 1) is kept in order not to interfere
the eﬀects of the patents with the eﬀects of the alternative IPR protection instrument.













































Figure 2.1: No IPR protection vs. perfectly enforced patents
As shown in Figure 1, there are both growth and welfare eﬀects of introducing fully
enforced patents, compared to the no IPR protection scenario. As the optimal patent length
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for the North is higher than the endogenous distance of the South, the life of any variety in
the North is now longer, which results in an increase in the demand for manufacturing labor
in that region. On the other hand, as the relative wage rises, the products from the North
become relatively more expensive for the consumers, putting a downward pressure on the
demand for Northern products. However, the ﬁrst eﬀect is larger, and thus the decrease in
research labor results in a fall in γ and the growth rate (1.14% decrease) until the equalibrium
in the labor market is restored. Figure 1 shows substantial welfare changes as opposed to
the no protection scenario, but of diﬀerent signs for the North and the South. Since the
rise in the relative wage is more than proportional to the rise in the price index, Northern
welfare increases (0.27% increase), while the welfare in the South is reduced (4.54% decrease)
due to the negative eﬀect of the increase in the price index (lower quality and higher prices,
common to both regions). More importantly, the total world welfare is reduced by 2%.
The positive eﬀect of increasing the patent length on Northern welfare is not present
when the IPR protection is tightened through an increase in the information protection. In
that case, stronger protection raises the overall diﬃculty of copying directly and increases the
lag of the South faster. The increase in the relative wage is not high enough to compensate
for the faster increase in the price index, which comes due to a slower transfer of production
to the low-cost South.
It might be reasonable to assume that when strong IPR protection in the form of patents
is imposed, not only that copying is prohibited for T range of varieties, but the productivity of
copying is reduced for any particular distance from the quality frontier point. In other words,
besides direct impediments for imitational R&D, patents might also impose an indirect
impediment for the transfer of general knowledge and degrade the process of the imitator’s
knowledge accumulation. This corresponds to an increase in η that comes along with the
introduction of patents. In this case, the eﬀect on growth is negative and so is the eﬀect on
both Northern and Southern welfares, as opposed to the world with unrestricted knowledge
diﬀusion. With a 10% higher η, optimal patent length increases to 25 years. The relative
wage increase is not big enough to counteract the rise in the price index for the North and
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the welfare is reduced. In the South, welfare losses come as a result of a higher price index.
Global welfare now drops by 5.34%.
2.2.3 Social optimum
This section introduces a social planner who maximizes global welfare and decides on
the optimal patent length, T sp, and labor allocation between the manufacturing and the
R&D sector. The social planner associates a certain weight to each region’s utility, with
(1 − δ) and δ, δ ∈ [0,1], as the weights on consumers’ utility in the North and the South,
respectively. The constraints social planner faces are given by: (1) total labor resources,
(2) production technology, (3) the law of motion for the quality index in the North and the
South, i.e. the R&D sector technology, and (4) the trade balance which is now expressed in
terms of quantities, and the shadow values of input factors and traded output between the






−ρt lnu(t)dt subject to (2.10)























Sexp = ¯ ωX
Nexp,
where Lp represents manufacturing labor, q the quality index, ¯ ω the rate et which goods are
exchanged in the international market, and Xexp the quantity exported. The social planner
takes into account that the eﬃcient allocation would imply symmetry of
x(z)
eγz ratios across
5See Grossman and Helpman (1992), Chapter 6.
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the goods produced in the same region, and thus the instantaneous utility, u(t), can be
expressed as a function of total labor employed in manufacturing (for domestic consumption
and export) and the quality index, q.
Figure 2.2 presents the optimal labor allocation between the manufacturing and the
R&D sector in the North, and the optimal patent length, T sp. The ﬁrst panel gives the
solutions of a planner who is concerned only with the welfare of the North, the middle panel
assumes equal weights on the welfare in the North and the South, while in the third panel
the planner associates full weight to the consumers in the South. The circled areas present
the combination of R&D labor share and patent length that result in the highest global
welfare, given the weights on each region’s utility.
Compared to the results of a decentralized equilibrium, the panels show an increase in
the research labor share in the North, resulting in a higher growth rate (11.1% with δ = 0),
and a shorter optimal patent lenght for all values of δ. Global welfare exhibits a substantial
increase compared to the decentralized outcome. With δ increasing from 0 to 1 (from full
weight on uN to full weight on uS), the optimal patent length increases from 2.5 to 4.2 years,
while the welfare is the highest when the weights on the two region’s utilities are the same






















































































































Figure 2.2: Social planner’s solution
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From a social point of view, there is no rationale for promoting longer patents as a way
of promoting innovation in the North and welfare in both regions. As the social planner’s
optimal patent length is smaller even than the natural distance of the imitating South with
no IPR protection, it comes as straightforward to call for optimal government policy which
would restore static and dynamic eﬃciency using instruments other than the IPR protection.
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2.3 Non-perfect enforcement (restricted trade)
2.3.1 The Model
In the restricted trade scenario patents of a ﬁnite length are introduced, but are no longer
assumed to be enforced. Patents cannot prevent the South from imitating, but allow the
North to ban the copies of the protected originals from its market. Since the South produces
these varieties at a lower cost, it has no incentive to import them from the North, so that
there is an interval of nontraded varieties, those that are protected in the North and already
copied by the South. Thus, the trade occurs only in the ranges in which the regions are
sole producers; the North imports low quality varieties, [−∞,nN(t) − T], while the South




Traded by South Traded by North
T
Not traded
Figure 2.3: Restricted trade
The bundles consumed by the North and the South are of the same composition. However,
the prices of varieties in the non-traded range are now diﬀerent in the two markets. Therefore,
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The value of a new variety or copy is determined as a discounted stream of proﬁts over
the periods of ﬁrms’ operation. The production of a variety in the North does not cease
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with its successful imitation but only after the patent expires. Once it has been copied, the
variety is no longer shipped to the South which produces it on its own, but it is still placed in
the Northern market. Therefore, both Northern and Southern producers do not earn export
proﬁts over the whole period of operation, which is taken into account when discounting.










































with ˜ Pi = P
α
α−1
i e−γnN, for i = N,S. Equating the value of a new variety (copy) with the







































Full labor employment requires that all workers are allocated either to manufacturing or
R&D sectors which translates into the following conditions

































Assumed ﬁnancial autarky implies that in every period export revenues of the two regions
are the same, thus the trade balance condition has to be satisﬁed. This condition holds also
in the free trade scenario, but due to no non-traded varieties, price-quality index is the same
in both regions and the demand for any product is a share of the total world expenditure
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divided by the common index. Here, price indices diﬀer and the trade balance condition is

















Combining the arbitrage conditions, 2.13, with the labor market conditions, (2.14), and
using the trade balance, two out of three steady-state equilibrium equations are derived.
The third equation comes from the arbitrage conditions combined with the trade balance,
which completes the equilibrium system of the three equations endogenous in γ, d and ω.
LN = βγ(1 − α) + βα(r + γ)
(1 − e−γT) + ω
α
1−αe−γT




























As in the free trade scenario, equilibrium conditions in the restricted trade case can be
compared to those in the autarky (Chapter 1). The manufacturing labor is necessarily lower
than in the autarky, which implies reallocation of workers towards R&D and an increase in
the size of quality jumps. However, the magnitude of this change is now aﬀected also by
the patent length T and the equilibrium relative wage, which makes the analytical analysis
complicated enough to call for a numerical solution.
2.3.2 Numerical exercise
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 present the results of a numerical solution in the restricted trade
scenario, and the eﬀects of diﬀerent IPR policy measures introduced by the North (an increase
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of η and an increase of patent length T, respectively).6 Compared to the optimal enforced
patent case, the size of quality jumps is smaller for any level of protection, while the distance
and the relative wage are reduced. That contributes to a higher welfare in the South, but
a lower one in the North. The social planner’s welfare levels are still the highest. However,
in a decentralized economy, if the South is copying, the North will ﬁnd it optimal to impose
patents. In turn, if there is a possibility of not enforcing the patent and keeping the trade
partners, the South will ﬁnd this strategy to be the optimal one.
More interestingly, the two channels of the IPR policy measures (information protection
or patent length) have diﬀerent welfare eﬀects. The important issue is whether a change
in any of the two IPR instruments decided by the North could compensate for the poor
enforceability of the patents and restore the equilibrium welfare and growth rate under the
enforced patent (dotted lines in ﬁgures 2.4 and 2.5). For a given T = 19.5, which corresponds
to the optimal enforceable patent length for the North, an increase in η results in a rise of
the quality lag of the South (Figure 2.4).7























































Figure 2.4: Non-enforced patents: eﬀects of the information protection
6The calibration procedure is the same as that used in the previous chapter. See Appendix of Chapter 1
for details.
7T = 19.5 is also very close to the general US patent length of 20 years.
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For a change in η up to a certain level, the increase in the distance of the South does not
aﬀect the composition of the domestic and imported bundles of the North, i.e. the goods are
still obtained from the same producer. With a rise in the relative wage, Northern goods are
more expensive, resulting in an increase in the price index. However, the rise in the relative
wage more than compensates for this increase in the price index and the Northern welfare
rises. On the other hand, the South not only pays higher prices for Northern goods as the
relative wage rises, but pays high price on more goods that are now too diﬃcult to copy.
Therefore, the Southern welfare necessarily decreases. At the same time, the relative price
index falls. For an increase in η larger than 8%, the distance of the South becomes larger
than the patent length, and the North has to continue with the production of some of the
goods that are no longer protected but are also not copied by the South. This hurts the price
index in the North as it can no longer import some of the cheap varieties from the South.
At that point, the rise in the relative wage does not cover for the rise in the price index and
the Northern welfare starts decreasing. It is important to note that even though the initial
increase in the intensive IPR protection has a positive eﬀect on the welfare in the North, it
is not possible to reach the welfare levels of the optimal (fully enforced) patent scenario by
substituting the lack of patent enforceability with the information ﬂow restriction. Moreover,
the eﬀect on the welfare in the South is negative for any change in η.
The same conclusion holds for the change in the other policy instrument, patent length.
In fact, increasing the patent length in order to compensate for bad enforcement is welfare
reducing for both regions, for any change in T (Figure 2.5).
For a given η, an increase in the patent length brings about an increase in the relative
price index, which is an eﬀect opposite from the one of the previously analyzed IPR policy
tool. Rise in the quality distance is pushing up the price index in the South due to an
increase in the relative wage. Southern welfare decreases, but longer T, on the other hand,
implies that now the North imports fewer varieties as more copies are banned, and thus pays
higher prices for more low quality varieties (the composition eﬀect). It turns out that the
Borota, Teodora (2009) North-South Trade and Growth: The Role of Product Quality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/137392.3. NON-PERFECT ENFORCEMENT (RESTRICTED TRADE) 59



















































Figure 2.5: Non-enforced patents: eﬀects of the patent length increase
latter eﬀect always dominates the wage eﬀect and the welfare in the North decreases, as well.
Moreover, it is not only that the price index composition eﬀect is much stronger, but the
rise in the relative wage is not as strong as in the previous scenario. Namely, longer patent
increases d, but does not hurt the productivity of the R&D labor in the South, and therefore
does not aﬀect the relative wage to a large extent. On the other hand, an increase in η has
a direct negative eﬀect on the R&D productivity in the South which results in a stronger
relative wage rise.
At lower patent lengths, the increase in the relative wage is still strong enough to secure
a rising relative utility, but compared to the eﬀect of η, the rise in the relative utility is now
slower. For an even larger patent length, d starts falling and the relative wage (expenditure)
increase is not suﬃcient to reverse the strong eﬀect the rising relative prices have on the
utility. As a result, the relative welfare falls. In other words, by increasing the patent
length, the North does not only hurt the welfare of both regions, but may do so to a larger
extent in the case of its own consumers.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper considered an endogenous R&D model of the two regions where the North
conducts innovating R&D, which results in the creation of new varieties, each of a higher
quality than the preceding one. The South is involved in the imitation of Northern products
but at a certain lag. With opening to trade, the two regions specialize in the production and
export in diﬀerent quality segments of the market, the North in high quality and the South
in the low one, which supports the empirical ﬁndings on current world trade patterns.
The model was used to address two questions, the welfare and growth implications of
perfectly enforced patents of ﬁnite length compared to the no-IPR protection scenario, and
the eﬀects of alternative IPR policy measures when patents are poorly enforced.
The imitational R&D productivity in the South decreases as the South attempts to copy
products from the higher position on the quality scale, and thus, it is found that the natural
distance of the South in the equilibrium will be positive even with no IPR protection. The
welfare optimizing patent length, from the perspective of the North, is positive and larger
than the natural distance of the South, but it necessarily reduces the welfare of the South
and growth in both regions. This is due to the fact that patents do not enforce incentives for
R&D, but only protect the monopoly rents, increase the wage gap and the cost of R&D in
both regions. This in turn reduces both the innovation and the imitation, and the welfare of
the South. An increase in the welfare of the North comes only as a result of a higher wage.
Compared to the social optimum, welfare and growth in both regions are reduced, as the
optimal specialization pattern of the two regions over quality becomes distorted.
The goal of the second part of the analysis was to determine whether an intensive form
of protection (the knowledge ﬂow restriction, secrecy) or the extension of the patent length
can serve as a substitute in the case when patents are not enforced in the South. The
results show that increased protectionism in any form results in lower welfare in the South,
while increasing information protection might increase welfare in the North up to a certain
point. However, growth eﬀects are always negative, and neither global nor individual region’s
welfare can attain the welfare levels of the no-IPR protection world.
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World Trade Patterns and Prices:
The Role of Productivity and Quality
Heterogeneity
Joint work with Cristiana Benedetti Fasil
3.1 Introduction
World trade patterns and their relation to the technological development and income
per capita levels of the trading partners have been studied extensively in the theoretical
and empirical literature. Employing either the traditional trade models or the new trade
theory incorporating the notion of heterogeneous ﬁrms, the studies have focused on the
determinants of the direction and intensity of trade ﬂows and the empirical validity of such
models. We wish to analyze import and export prices, and trade patterns within and across
the regions of the North and the South (developed, relatively richer countries and developing
countries, respectively). We provide a theoretical framework for this analysis in the form of a
four country North-South trade model with heterogeneous ﬁrms in two dimensions, product
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quality and labor eﬃciency, and focus on intra-industry trade, particularly the manufacturing
sector.
To the extent that the unit values of traded goods can represent quality, data on export
and import prices might as well serve as evidence of countries’ trade specialization and
demand schedules over quality. Fieler (2007) ﬁnds that export prices increase with income
per capita of the origin country. Schott (2004) presents evidence on positive variation of
US import prices depending on the exporter’s income per capita. Furthermore, it is found
that import prices are positively related to income per capita, as well as that countries of
diﬀerent income per capita import goods of diﬀerent prices from the same exporter. This
evidence suggests that rich countries not only specialize in the production and export of
relatively higher quality goods, but that they devote larger share of income on high quality
imports and possibly high quality total consumption.1 Most of the literature that proposes
a theoretical basis for this analysis starts from either non-homothetic preferences, where
diﬀerent income levels generate diﬀerent demand structures, or standard preferences with
arbitrarily imposed diﬀerent ”love for quality” parameters in the North and the South. The
supply side mechanisms result in a comparative advantage in the production of goods that
are in high domestic demand. Non-homothetic preferences might be the immediate natural
assumption for explaining reported increase in traded goods’ prices with income per capita,
but are certainly not the only factor. Although the arbitrary parametrization of preferences
might be regarded as a way around modeling the black box of demand heterogeneity across
countries, non-homothetic preferences do have some empirical support in the micro-level
data. The purpose of this paper is not to contradict these ﬁndings, but to show that when the
attention is shifted from modeling preferences to modeling technology more closely, standard
preferences model with ﬁxed operational and trade cost can yield the stated predictions as
well.
1These ﬁndings, however, should not be taken as a straightforward support for the diﬀerences in expen-
diture distribution over quality in the North and the South, as traded goods might present only a minor
share of total consumption.
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We wish to give more weight to the supply side mechanisms and their role in shaping the
demand structure and therefore, we use homothetic preference structure. Speciﬁcally, the
focus is on the technology endowments of the North and the South which are the main de-
terminants of the production and export specialization, and the relative income per capita of
the two regions. The North has a higher level of technological development, while the South
lags behind the North and uses a lower level of technology. Firms in each region are hetero-
geneous in two technology (productivity) dimensions: product quality and labor eﬃciency
which together determine the ﬁrms’ domestic and foreign market proﬁtability. Existing mod-
els of trade and heterogeneous ﬁrms that introduce only one productivity dimension, such
as Melitz (2003), predict a negative relation between export prices and income per capita
since higher technological development implies higher cost eﬃciency and thus lower prices.
Empirical evidence on export prices calls for the introduction of the quality dimension of
heterogeneity in a way that it generates positive relation between quality and price. In
this sense, Northern technology allows this region to produce relatively higher quality-higher
price varieties, while the South specializes in the production of lower quality-lower price
varieties.
In this framework, the export decision of any ﬁrm depends on its quality-eﬃciency level
which determines the proﬁtability and thus the ability to cover the ﬁxed cost of exporting.
Consumers place greater value on products of higher quality, but quality also generates
higher marginal cost of production. Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) develops a model of trade
and heterogeneous ﬁrms in the quality dimension. They assume that quality rises faster
than marginal cost and thus high quality-high cost varieties are the most proﬁtable ones.
Therefore, export proﬁtability is increasing in quality (and price) monotonically. In that
set-up, lower aggregate expenditure of the South implies that only the most proﬁtable ﬁrms
can cover the ﬁxed cost of trade and export to the South, while the pool of exporters to
the North is larger. However, this does not match the empirical evidence, as it results
in the negative relationship between income per capita and import prices conditional on
exporter. We introduce a separate measure of cost eﬃciency which aﬀects the marginal cost
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independently of the quality. Each ﬁrm (variety) is characterized by a quality level which
aﬀects positively both utility and the cost of production, and by a labor eﬃciency level which
decreases the marginal cost. Quality and eﬃciency together determine the productivity level
of the ﬁrms, which are distributed across quality-eﬃciency pairs, with the Southern joint
distribution having a lower mean due to its technological lag behind the North. With the
two dimensions of heterogeneity, less proﬁtable ﬁrms that export only to the North, also
include those with highest quality but lower eﬃciency, and therefore a higher price. This
contributes to a rise in the average import price with income per capita conditional on
exporter. In this sense, Northern average import price is higher not because it consumes
higher quality than the South, but due to the fact that it consumes also the high priced -
high quality varieties. Given the right-skewed distribution of ﬁrms in equilibrium, varieties
of this type are relatively numerous and this ampliﬁes the eﬀect on the average import price
and insures that North imports higher price varieties on average.
In aggregate terms, the greater income of the North compared to the South implies not
only a greater expenditure on any good that is available in both regions, but higher levels in
equal proportion across goods, due to homothetic preferences. However, with ﬁxed cost of
export only a subset of varieties is exported to foreign markets, and the resulting expenditure
shares on certain quality are not equal across regions. The North spends a lower share of
income on low quality varieties originated from the South, while the South spends a lower
share on high quality produced in the North, both relative to the other region’s share of
expenditure on those varieties. If the income diﬀerence between the regions is suﬃciently
large, the statement above holds also in absolute terms. The South’s larger share of income is
allocated to domestic varieties of low quality, while the North spends more on the high quality
produced domestically and imported from the other Northern country. Due to competition
pressures from the South in the intermediate quality goods markets (lower quality portion
of the production in the North), these varieties are only produced for the local market in
the North, at a reduced scale. A part of these varieties are not exported by the South and
thus not consumed by the North. More proﬁtable varieties are exported by the South, but
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in a smaller share compared to those of a higher quality as they are in lower demand and
are fewer.
The analysis of trade intensities within and across regions refers to the Linder hypothesis.
Linder (1961) argues that on the demand side, countries with high (low) income per capita
spend a larger fraction of their income on high (low) quality goods. On the supply side,
countries develop a comparative advantage in the goods that are in high domestic demand,
so high (low) income countries produce high (low) quality goods. Both these premises are
predicted by our model, but Linder’s hypothesis goes further. The demand and supply
premises are combined in order to argue that the overlap of production and consumption
patterns between countries of similar income per capita should induce them to trade more
intensively with one another. Rich trade more with rich, while poor trade with poor. Our
model predicts the highest intensity and value of the North-North trade. The ordering of the
South-South and the North-South trade depends on the ﬁxed and/or variable costs of trade,
in particular on their asymmetries that are conditional on the origin and destination country.
With symmetric costs, North-South trade is of higher value, but the result is reversed when
stronger restrictions on Southern exports to the North are imposed. However, there is no
robust empirical support of the Linder hypothesis. Namely, it is important to ascertain the
level of aggregation at which the ”Linder” mechanism might operate. Hallak (2008) shows
that the trade intensities prediction is valid on both sides of income per capita distribution
at the sectoral level (for some sectors), but is strongly rejected when data is aggregated over
sectors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, Section 2 presents the model and deﬁne
the equilibrium, Section 3 discusses the results of the numerical exercise, while Section 4
concludes.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Consumers
We propose a two region North-South trade model where each region, the North and
the South, consists of two symmetric countries (two symmetric North and two symmetric
South). Consumers have equal, homothetic preferences across countries and regions. In
every period, consumers choose consumption and supply labor inelastically at the wage rate
wN in the North and wS in the South, with wN > wS. Labor is not mobile across regions
and the aggregate measure of population in each country in the North and the South regions
is LN and LS, respectively. Consumers allocate optimally the aggregate consumption X
across diﬀerentiated varieties produced by domestic ﬁrms and those imported from abroad.
The measure of available goods in each country is hence given by domestic goods of measure
IJD, imports from the other country of the same region, IJJ, and from the two countries
of the other region, IJK, with J = {N,S},J  = K. Thus, IN = IND + INN + 2ISN for
the North and similarly for the South, IS = ISD + ISS + 2INS. We use the same index to
represent both the region and the country of a particular region, as we assume symmetry
in all environment dimensions of the countries within a region. However, the varieties they
produce are perceived as diﬀerent by the consumers and thus are all in demand, i.e. each
country’s consumers demand varieties from the other country of the same region as well as
the goods of both countries of the other region. The utility function for country J is given










where x(i,t) is the quantity and q(i) is the quality of a variety i ∈ IJ consumed at time
t. The standard CES utility index is augmented to account for the quality variation across
products where quality acts as a utility shifter: a consumer prefers high quality over low
quality products. The elasticity of substitution between any two goods is constant and equal
to σ = 1/(1 − α) > 1, with α ∈ (0,1).
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Consumers derive the optimal demand for each good, both domestic and foreign, maxi-
mizing their utility subject to the individual budget constraint EJ(t) =
 
i∈IJ p(i,t)x(i,t)di,
where EJ(t) presents total expenditure in country J and p(i,t) is the price of variety i ∈ IJ
































and Xt = Ut. (3.3)
Although consumer preferences are the same in both regions, the bundles of varieties con-
sumed are diﬀerent. Due to ﬁxed cost of export, a subset of varieties in each region is
not exported, resulting in a diﬀerent consumption composition and price schedules across
regions. This yields diﬀerent price indices as averages of the quality weighted prices of all
varieties consumed by a region, domestically produced and imported.
This paper focuses on the analysis of the steady-state equilibrium in which all variables
are constant and we omit the time subscripts in the further text.
3.2.2 Firms
Firms in each region diﬀer in two dimensions of ﬁrm heterogeneity. The ﬁrst source
of heterogeneity is labor eﬃciency(in further text, eﬃciency), a(i) ∈ R++, which increases
the marginal productivity of labor, as in the seminal paper of Hopenhayn (1992). The
second source is quality of a ﬁrm’s variety, q(i) ∈ R++ \(0,1), which decreases the marginal
productivity of labor. In this respect, a higher quality variety implies a higher variable cost
as in Verhoogen (2008), but contributes positively to consumers’ utility. The production
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where n(i) is the production labor employed by ﬁrm i and χ,η ∈ (0,1). Firms in both
regions distribute over quality and eﬃciency, and we assume that each ﬁrm produces only
one variety so that the index i identiﬁes both the ﬁrm and the corresponding variety it
produces. Firms in the North lead in both productivity dimensions while ﬁrms in the South
lag behind the more advanced Northern technology.
In both regions ﬁrms enter and exit the market and the industry is characterized at the
steady-state equilibrium.
Production decision
Each ﬁrm is the monopolistic producer of its own variety. Firms pay a ﬁxed operational
cost, cf, expressed in terms of labor in order to produce, and incur an iceberg export cost
τ > 1 in the units of output and a ﬁxed export cost cex, expressed in terms of labor, in order
to export.2 The ﬁxed operational cost is necessary to trigger exit while the ﬁxed export
cost generates the partition between exporter and non exporter ﬁrms. Given the same labor
requirement for the ﬁxed cost of operation and export in the North and the South, it follows
that both costs are higher in the North due to its higher wage.
Solving the standard monopolistic problem, ﬁrms in each country J charge a price pJD
in the domestic market and a price pJX in the foreign market which takes into account the










for the products sold in the foreign markets. Substituting these expressions for prices in the
demand function it follows that x(i) is increasing in a and it is decreasing in q iﬀ η > α. We
restrict our attention to the speciﬁcation when this condition holds.
2In the benchmark model we assume symmetric τ across regions in order to abstract from this form of
relative price distortion across regions and analyze only the eﬀect of the ﬁxed cost of export on the patterns
of trade.
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Firms total proﬁts are the sum of the proﬁts obtained in the domestic market and the
proﬁts from the foreign markets when it is proﬁtable to export. Hence the optimal proﬁts














































Since export proﬁts depend on the aggregate variables of the foreign region, this is the
channel through which the aggregate economy of the foreign region aﬀects the proﬁtability
of the domestic ﬁrms.
The max operator in πN and πS indicates the choice of each ﬁrm to specialize only in
the domestic market, or to open to foreign markets when the proﬁts derived from exporting
exceed the ﬁxed cost of export, cex. This choice depends on both eﬃciency and quality of the
variety produced by the ﬁrms. The speciﬁcation of χ and η aﬀects not only the concavity of
proﬁts in the two productivity dimensions, but also the ratio of the proﬁt elasticities with
respect to each dimension. With χ bigger (smaller) than 1 − η the proﬁts increase faster
along the eﬃciency (quality) dimension, which shapes the isoproﬁt curves in the (a,q) space
and thus the export productivity threshold functions.
The two sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity imply that the thresholds that characterize the
border between export and not export are given by the inﬁnite combinations of the (a,q)
couples. For this reason, it becomes convenient to express the reservation values in terms of
eﬃciency as a function of quality3, a(q), and to obtain a cutoﬀ function rather than cutoﬀ
3It is equivalent to express product quality as a function of eﬃciency, q(a). Using a speciﬁc formulation
for the cut-oﬀ function does not aﬀect the implications of the model.
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values as in one factor heterogeneous ﬁrm models. For a given q ∈ Q it is possible to deﬁne the


































The cutoﬀ functions are decreasing in quality which implies that a ﬁrm characterized by
a low level of eﬃciency but a high quality may still ﬁnd it optimal to export. However, with
χ > 1 − η, the cutoﬀ eﬃciency is decreasing in quality at a decreasing rate. We assume
this condition holds, as it captures the idea of increasing diﬃculty in keeping the export
market shares for the ﬁrms that produce high quality varieties with low eﬃciency which
results in a high price. In other words, this assumption represents minimum (cost) eﬃciency
requirements for exporting.
Given that the export decision depends on the aggregate variables of the foreign country,
the export cutoﬀ functions depend on the foreign aggregates as well. The cutoﬀ functions
are increasing in the wage of the exporting country as higher wage implies higher ﬁxed cost
of export and higher export price, while they decrease in the total expenditure and the price
index of the destination country. Higher expenditure (income) of the destination market
implies higher purchasing power of the market, while higher price index represents lower
competition pressures on the exporting ﬁrm. As the total expenditure depends on the size
of the population in the destination country, it follows that a larger export market implies
higher proﬁtability and lower cutoﬀ productivity levels. The order of the cutoﬀs for export to
diﬀerent regions is determined by the ratio of the aggregates of the two regions, P
α
1−αE. The
condition that results in larger export cutoﬀ compared to the operation cutoﬀ productivity
level in both regions, and the discussion on the eﬀect of the aggregates is presented in
Appendix A.
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The exit decision
Every ﬁrm faces an exogenous probability of a bad shock δ which forces the ﬁrm to exit
the market. Besides this exogenous exit, ﬁrms exit the market when their proﬁts are not
enough to cover the ﬁxed operational cost, cf. The exit cutoﬀ functions for given q ∈ Q for

















The exit cutoﬀ functions are decreasing in quality produced: high quality allows for an
easier survival. However, the exit cutoﬀs depend only on the domestic aggregates. In other
words, for a given quality ﬁrm partition in both the North and the South is such that ﬁrms
with low level of eﬃciency (a) exit the industry, ﬁrms with intermediate levels produce only
for the domestic market, while the most eﬃcient ﬁrms produce for both the domestic and
the foreign markets, ﬁrst for the market in the North and then for the foreign markets in
both regions. The stated order of the ﬁrm partition is assured by the conditions on the ﬁxed
costs of operation and export.4 The rest of the model is then derived assuming that these
conditions hold, and hence only some of the ﬁrms in both the North and the South survive
and only some of the successful ﬁrms export.
Firms entry
Each period, MJ ﬁrms enter the industry and pay a sunk entry cost, ce, expressed in
terms of labor. After paying the entry cost they draw the product quality and eﬃciency
level (productivity vector (a,q)) from a bivariate distribution GJ(a,q), J = {N,S}, with
corresponding density gJ(a,q). The density function in the North, gN(a,q), is assumed to
be log-normal and exogenous while gS(a,q|µN) is log-normal but its mean, gS, is determined
as a fraction of the incumbents joint mean in the North, µN, which will be deﬁned in the
next section.5 The assumption attempts to capture the idea of imitative R&D in the South
4See Appendix A. for the discussion on exit and export cutoﬀs.
5This speciﬁcation is similar to the one used in Gabler and Licandro (2005).
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which copies the technology of the North at a certain lag due to high diﬃculty of copying
the advanced goods. As we don’t model the R&D process endogenously, we might justify
this assumption by the evidence on diﬀerences in North-South TFP levels documented in
the literature.6
We assume that the free entry condition holds in equilibrium. Firms in the North and
the South enter the industry until the expected value of the ﬁrm, v, is equal to the entry
costs. With the value of the ﬁrm given as the discounted future ﬂow of proﬁts, and with no













3.2.3 Cross sectional distribution and aggregates






































Q gS(a,q|µN)dqda are the ex-ante prob-
abilities of surviving for the ﬁrms in the North and the South, respectively. In a sim-



























To compute the weighted mean of Northern productivity, necessary to determine the
distribution of the ﬁrms in the South, we need to deﬁne the mass of incumbents in each
6See for example, Cordoba and Ripoll (2008), Jerzmanowski (2007), Hall and Jones (1999).
Borota, Teodora (2009) North-South Trade and Growth: The Role of Product Quality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/137393.2. THE MODEL 75
country. Hence, IND and ISD also represent the measure of varieties produced in each
country of the North and the South, so INN
ex = P NN
ex IND, INS
ex = P NS
ex IND, ISN
ex = P SN
ex ISD
and ISS
ex = P SS
ex ISD are the masses of exporting ﬁrms and exported varieties in the North
and the South, respectively. This means that the mass of available varieties in each country
is given by the mass of varieties produced domestically plus the mass of varieties imported:
IN = IND + INN
ex + 2ISN
ex for the North, and IS = ISD + ISS
ex + 2INS
ex for the South.
The average weighted productivity for the North is computed taking into account not
only the output share of the domestic ﬁrms, but the additional export share of the better






























































































ex (a,q) and ˜ µJK
ex (a,q) are the conditional distributions of ﬁrms exporting to the
North and of ﬁrms exporting to both regions, respectively, given that the ﬁrm survives in
the market.
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3.2.4 Steady-state equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium is characterized by prices (pJD,pJX), wages (wJ), exit and
export cutoﬀ functions (aJ
x(q),aJJ
ex (q),aJK
ex (q)), ﬁrm distributions (µJ), number of ﬁrms in
each region (IJD) and the aggregate expenditure and price indices (EJ,P J) such that
• consumers choose consumption optimally and ﬁrms choose prices to maximize their
proﬁts
• exit and export cutoﬀ functions satisfy the conditions given in section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2
• entry and exit are such that the condition δIJD = P J
inMJ and the free entry condition
are satisﬁed
• distribution of ﬁrms in the North and the South are given by equations in section 2.3
• number of operating ﬁrms is such that the labor markets clear, i.e. total labor is used



































• the trade balance condition is satisﬁed, implying that the bilateral North-North, South-
South, North-South and South-North trade is balanced.7
We solve the model numerically using the value of parameters which are calibrated to
match the recent data on the aggregate trade values (shares of North-North, North-South
and South-South exports in the total world exports, relative wage of the South compared to
the North) and the ﬁrm-level variables.
7Due to symmetry between the countries of the same region, trade balance depends only on the values
of export ﬂows between countries of diﬀerent regions in equilibrium.
Borota, Teodora (2009) North-South Trade and Growth: The Role of Product Quality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/137393.2. THE MODEL 77
3.2.5 Calibration
In our quantitative exercise we choose the preference parameter, α, exponents on pro-
ductivity and quality in the production function, χ and η, exogenous exit probability, δ, the
variable trade cost, τ, the size of the countries, LN and LS, and the mean of the entrants in
the North, gN. α is set equal to 0.73 to match a mark-up over the marginal cost of 36%.8
χ and η are equal to 0.5 and 0.86, respectively. The results do not change qualitatively if χ
and η change as long as the conditions on these two exponent are satisﬁed. The exogenous
death probability is ﬁxed equal to 0.5% and hence ﬁrms’s life expectancy is a priori of 200
years.9 We assume that τ is symmetric across the four countries and equal to one to avoid
exogenous price distortions. Finally, LN, LS, and gN scale and locate the economy in the
space (a,q). The population is assumed to be the same in both the North and the South
and normlized to one while gN is set equal to 4.
The remaining parameters are the technological gap between the North and the South,
θ, the ﬁxed cost of entry, ce, the ﬁxed operational cost, cf, the ﬁxed cost of export, cex,
and the entrants distribution variance for the North and the South (assuming equal vari-
ance over productivity and quality and across countries). These parameters are calibrated
to match a number of salient feature related to the 2006 data on the within and across
region export shares in the total world exports, exit and entry rates in the manufacturing
industry and the South-North relative wage. The data on export shares are taken from The
OECD Policy Brief ”South-South Trade:Vital for Development”, August 2006, available at:
www.oecd.org/publications/Policybriefs and Goksel 2008. The reported export shares are
52.69% for the North-North trade, 40.86% for the North-South and 6.45% for the South-
South exports. Bartelsman et al. (2004) compute that the average ﬁrms exit rate in the
data for the North is around 10%, while it is slightly higher in the South, 20%. Accordingly
to the World Bank, International Comparison Program database, online edition, 2009 the
8For more details on mark-ups in models with heterogenous ﬁrms and ﬁxed costs see Ghironi and Melitz
2005.
9Atkeson and Burstein 2007 and Luttmer 2007 ﬁnd the same value calibrating δ.
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relative South-North wage in the manufacturing sector is on average 0.4.
Table 3.2 in Appendix B summarizes the parameters values both exogenously set and
calibrated, the empirical targets used for the calibration and the corresponding model mo-
ments.
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3.3 Results
This section presents the numerical results of the North-South trade model with four
countries, two symmetric Norths and two symmetric Souths. Given the productivity lag of
the entrants in the South behind the incumbents in the North, the selection of the ﬁrms in
the equilibrium results in the distribution of operating ﬁrms over productivity vectors in the
North and the South as presented in Figure 3.1. The equilibrium productivity lag of the
South results in the positive North-South wage diﬀerential in equilibrium.
Figure 3.1: Incumbents distribution over productivity and quality
When the North and the South are open to trade, the South produces the low produc-
tivity varieties that are demanded domestically but also by the North whose international
competitiveness in this portion of the distribution is weakened due to lower production cost
in the South. On the other hand, Northern ﬁrms are more spread out on the whole remaining
area of the productivity space, higher eﬃciency and higher quality. Few ﬁrms in the South
reach these productivity levels and thus the North specializes in the production and export
of higher (a,q) varieties.
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Figure 3.2 presents the partitioning of the ﬁrms across the (a,q) space into exiting ﬁrms,
domestic producers and exporters of two types, those that export only to the North and those
that export both to the North and the South. Analyzing the partition over the eﬃciency
dimension, the lowest a ﬁrms exit the industry in both regions, but the exit cutoﬀ in the
North is higher than in the South due to higher absolute value of the ﬁxed operational cost.
Therefore, it can be observed that the low eﬃciency varieties are consumed exclusively by
the South as the North exits this market, and as the South does not export due to low
proﬁtability. The North-South head-on competition occurs in the intermediate eﬃciency
range of varieties. Southern varieties are more competitive and are exported to the North,
while the North produces them only for the domestic consumption at a reduced scale. At
even higher levels of eﬃciency, the number of Southern ﬁrms (varieties) decreases. This
is principally the market for Northern exporters who employ a large share of the total
labor force in the North. Details on labor (size) distribution of ﬁrms and the values of
average productivities across diﬀerent areas of the (a,q) space in the North and the South
are presented in Appendix C.




































Figure 3.2: Firms partition
Bearing in mind the price schedule over the (a,q) space, the partitioning graph provides a
graphical explanation for positive relationship between the average export and import prices
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on one side and income per capita on the other. With χ > 1 − η the proﬁts increase faster
along the eﬃciency dimension, which shapes the isoproﬁt curves (cutoﬀ functions) in the
(a,q) space as presented in Figure 3.3.




























Figure 3.3: Distribution of prices
The shape of the cutoﬀ functions determines the quality and price composition of the
domestic and import bundles of the two regions. The most proﬁtable ﬁrms export both to
the North and the South, while less proﬁtable export only to the North. With χ > 1−η, the
bigger share of the relatively higher priced varieties (high q and low a) are not exported from
the North to the South and are shipped only to the North.10 Thus, the resulting average
import price is higher for the North. Moreover, given the exporting country, Northern
imports are of higher average quality relative to the imports of the South as more high
quality varieties are included in its import bundle. This eﬀect is not present with only one
dimension of ﬁrms heterogeneity as the proﬁts are just a monotonic transformation of the
price and the unique productivity measure. The North abandons the export of low price
varieties due to competition from the South, which results in higher export prices of the
North. However, it imports goods of higher average price not as it consumes higher quality
than the South but due to the fact that it additionally consumes the high priced high quality
10As opposed to the case with χ < 1−η when relatively low priced varieties are excluded from exports to
the South in a larger share than the high priced varieties.
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varieties. The analogue reasoning applies to the imports from the South. Average prices of
export and import are presented in Table 3.1.
Average Price North South
Exports 4.0739 0.9495
Imports 1.0072 0.9101
Imports from North 4.2514 3.9861
Imports from South 1.0008 0.9054
Table 3.1: Average Import Prices
The following graph (Figure 3.4) presents the expenditure shares distribution of the two
regions across diﬀerent levels of quality for a given eﬃciency of the ﬁrm. Northern demand
is relatively higher for the varieties produced by the high quality ﬁrms, and the South is
demanding relatively more of the goods in the lower quality portion of the distribution,
which is the eﬀect of the ﬁxed cost of trade. With no ﬁxed cost, the homothetic preferences
would result in a lower demand from the South but still in levels exactly proportional to
those of the North. Once the ﬁxed cost of export is introduced in both the North and the
South, this results in subsets of ﬁrms with only domestic sales, which subsequently distorts
the proportionality of the consumption shares of the two regions across varieties.
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Figure 3.4: Expenditure shares distribution over quality
Figure 3.5 shows the total trade values within and across two groups of countries with no
asymmetries in the variable costs of trade. The model implies that larger shares of Northern
export revenue is coming from the North due to higher proﬁtability requirements for the
export to the South and low absolute expenditure of the South. This implies higher import
between countries of the North. As a result, the North-North trade is the largest compared
to the other trade ﬂows, North-South and South-South. In this set-up North-South trade is
of higher value than the South-South trade, but the ranking reverses when the asymmetric
variable costs of trade are introduced, with the highest cost imposed on Southern exports
to the North. Some empirical evidence points to these asymmetries in the form of higher
export barriers imposed on the exporters from the South (such as iceberg trade cost, quality
requirements, tariﬀs). In sectors with these asymmetries, our model’s results might support
the ﬁnal conjecture of the Linder hypothesis, besides predicting the demand and supply
premises.
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Figure 3.5: Total trade values within and across regions
3.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of eﬃciency and quality in shaping the trade patterns and
trade intensities within and across two groups of countries, the developed and richer North
and the developing South. We employ a four country North-South trade model with two
dimensions of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Matching the empirical values of within and across region
export shares in the total world exports, we show that the equilibrium results support the
ranking of the average prices of tradables within and across regions as found in the data.
This result is not previously found in the literature since using only one technology dimension
does not simultaneously allow for increasing relation between export prices, import prices
and import prices conditional on exporter on one side and income per capita on the other.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd diﬀerences in the consumption bundles across regions even though
the preferences are of standard, homothetic form. Namely, the resulting total expenditure
allocation across quality shows that the North spends a larger share of its income on high
quality while the South allocates more of its expenditure on low quality varieties. Therefore,
we wish to stress that the trade patterns in this model are not determined by the non-
homotheticity of preferences and therefore do not originate exclusively from the demand
structures. The results mainly come from the supply side through the productivity distri-
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bution of incumbents and its eﬀect on prices. This in turn allows the ﬁxed cost of exporting
to act in a way that the empirically observed trading pattern is replicated. In other words,
it is not that the consumers alone have diﬀerent preferences over qualities based on their in-
come but diﬀerences in productivity and income (coming endogenously from the productivity
level) are the principal deciding factors.
The future research agenda calls for the development of an endogenous R&D mechanism
which will determine technology level of the North and the South in equilibrium. In this
hypothetical set-up, ﬁrm would choose the level of their investment in technology, which
would aﬀect the initial productivity draw through the innovation in the North and technol-
ogy adoption in the South. R&D incentives would come partly from the domestic demand
structure but also as a response to foreign demand, which would together shape the compar-
ative advantage of each region over quality segments. This allows for the analysis of several
issues such as trade liberalization, income inequality and R&D subsidies to promote welfare.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the set-up is easily extendable to include n countries
which allows for more empirically testable predictions.
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3.5 Appendix A: Conditions on ﬁxed costs and tech-
nological lag
The setup of the model requires that the exit cutoﬀ in any region, aJ
x(q), is lower than the
export cutoﬀ, aJK
ex (q), in order to rule out the possibility of ﬁrms not operating domestically,
and producing only for the export market. To insure this we impose conditions on the ﬁxed
costs of production and export, and on the level of the technological lag of the South behind
the North. With ﬁxed export cost cex higher than the ﬁxed operational cost cf, the cutoﬀ
for exporting to the other country of the same region (North-North and South-South trade)
will be higher than the exit cutoﬀ. However, to insure higher cutoﬀ for exporting to the













As the equilibrium wage and price indices are functions of the technological lag θ, it follows
that the three parameters together determine whether the condition above holds. The rela-
tive size of the population in the two regions aﬀects the relative size of the aggregates and
therefore the ratio of exit cutoﬀs in the North and the South, and the ordering of export
cutoﬀs conditional on the destination country. In general, if the South is suﬃciently larger
than the North, the aggregates of the South might be larger than those of the North even
with the relative wage smaller than one. However, the calibration exercise shows that such a
large South would neither match the data on the actual size of trading partners in the North
and the South nor the model could be considered as the model of North-South trade as the
share of the Southern ﬁrms exporting to the North would be approaching zero. Therefore,
without the loss of generality, we assume equal sizes of the regions. We ﬁnd that under
the wide range of cf, cex and θ that satisfy the stated condition, the resulting ordering of
the cutoﬀs is such that the exit cutoﬀ is higher in the North than in the South. Moreover,
the exporters of relatively lower productivity export only to the North, while the highest
productivity ﬁrms export also to the South.
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3.6 Appendix B: Calibration
Table 3.2: Targets and Parameters
Targets Data Model
North-North Export Share 52.69% 54.95%
North-South Export Share 40.86% 42.49%
North Exit Rate 10% 10.43%
South Exit Rate 20% 23.43%




cf 11.42% of avg North domestic employment
cex 29.51% of avg North domestic employment








LN = LS 1
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3.7 Appendix C: Size distribution and average produc-
tivities




















 Conditional on being South Non Exporter
 Conditional on being North Non Exporter
 Conditional on being North Exporter
 Conditional on being South Exporter
Figure 3.6: Conditional Labor Distribution over Technology
Weighted Average Technology North South
Total 16.76 8.38
Domestic 15.01 8.05
Export to North 17.23 13.29
Export to N and S 19.79 16.18
Table 3.3: Weighted Average Technology Across Firm Partition
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